When dueling emotions and conflicting beliefs predict subjective ambivalence: The role of meta-bases

Abstract

Within the emotions and beliefs upon which attitudes are based, people can hold simultaneously positive and negative reactions. In addition, independent from the emotions and beliefs in their attitude structure, people hold subjective perceptions about their affective and cognitive attitudinal bases (i.e., meta-bases), which reflect interest in processing emotions or beliefs, respectively. We tested how much people experience subjective ambivalence when they hold mixed positive and negative affective or cognitive reactions and whether this depends on relevant meta-bases. In Study 1, for an attitude object dominated by affective meta-bases (i.e., strong interest in processing emotions), intra-affect conflict (IAC), but not intra-cognition conflict (ICC), predicted subjective ambivalence (SA). Moreover, individual differences in meta-bases mattered. Even for a normatively affective meta-basis topic, ICC predicted SA among individuals with relatively cognitive meta-bases but not those with relatively affective meta-bases (Study 2). Similarly, even for a normatively cognitive meta-basis topic, IAC predicted SA among individuals with relatively affective meta-bases but not those with cognitive meta-bases (Study 3). In Study 4, both IAC and ICC's effects on SA were moderated by individual differences in meta-bases for a topic without a clearly normative meta-basis. Study 5 demonstrated that ICC caused more SA for individuals who received cognitive meta-bases feedback than those who received affective meta-bases feedback, whereas IAC caused more SA for individuals who received affective meta-bases feedback than cognitive meta-bases feedback. Thus, we shed light on novel distinctions between intra-affect and intra-cognition conflict in the experience of ambivalence.