Abstract
AbstractIn international relations, short‐run incentives for non‐cooperation often dominate. Yet, (external) institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty, supposedly strengthening the role of self‐enforcing mechanisms. This paper examines their scope with a focus on contingent protection aka tit‐for‐tat in trade policy. Highlighting various strategies in a partial equilibrium framework, we show that retaliation of non‐cooperative behaviour by limiting market access works as a disciplining device quite independently of supply and demand parameters. Our empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical results in that countries more frequently involved in WTO‐mediated disputes entailing tit‐for‐tat strategies pursue on average more liberal trade regimes.
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