When digital taxes come due: national digital taxes and the negotiation of the OECD inclusive framework

Abstract

ABSTRACT What explains major shifts in international tax cooperation? Existing literature emphasises either the centrality of the United States for successful reform or the power of multinational corporations to exert downward pressure on global tax rates. Nonetheless, in 2021 members of the OECD Inclusive Framework (IF) agreed to tax some of the largest multinational companies based on their market activities rather than physical presence – a fundamental change to the international taxation regime that the U.S. government and U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) had long opposed. We argue that the spread of digital value chains has exposed the activities of MNCs to greater regulatory activity, allowing governments to use unilateral regulatory action as leverage in international negotiations. By shifting the reversion point – the status quo absent an international agreement – governments were collectively able to transform an agreement. We demonstrate our argument by examining how the implementation of national digital services taxes (DSTs) affected the OECD IF negotiations. Drawing on interviews with key stakeholders and primary sources, we show that the adoption of DSTs, including in France and India, and the threat of additional proliferation of DSTs, pushed the United States to drop its longstanding opposition to parts of the IF process.