Abstract
Interference tasks combining different distractor types usually find that between-trial adaptations (congruency sequence effects [CSEs]) do not interact with each other, suggesting that sensorimotor control is domain-specific. However, within each trial, different distractor types often do interact, suggesting that control is domain-general. The present study presents a solution to this apparent paradox. In 3 experiments, testing 130 participants in total, we (a) confirm the simultaneous presence of between-trial domain-specific (noninteracting) CSEs and within-trial "domain-general" interactions in a fully factorial hybrid prime-Simon design free of repetition or contingency confounds; (b) demonstrate that the within-trial interaction occurs with supraliminal, but not with subliminal primes; and (c) show that it is disproportionately enlarged in older adults. Our findings suggest that whereas interference (priming and Simon) effects and CSEs reflect direct sensorimotor control, the within-trial interaction does not reflect sensorimotor control but "confusion" at higher-level processing stages (reactivation aversion effect [RAE]). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
Highlights
A moth might have no choice but to circle the light but we, as humans, are generally able to inhibit a prepotent but detrimental action in favor of one better suited to our current goals—at least to some extent
We find that relative to neutral trials, responses are typically faster and more accurate with goalcorresponding distractors, and slower and less accurate with noncorresponding ones. Such interference effects occur across widely different distractor domains, both with target-like distractors presented in close spatial and/or temporal proximity to the target (Eriksen flanker and priming paradigms, respectively; e.g., Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Schlaghecken & Martini, 2012), as well as with distractors that are non-target-like stimuli or features, such as the target’s semantic content (Stroop task; Stroop, 1935) or its spatial location relative to the response hand (Simon task; Simon & Rudell, 1967), or unrelated stimuli presented near the response hand
Interference magnitude varies between individuals, and varies systematically with task context: Typically, interference effects are reduced (a) when a second goal-noncorresponding distractor is present within the same trial; (b) when a goal-noncorresponding distractor was present on the immediately preceding trial (Gratton or congruency sequence effect [congruency sequence effects (CSEs)]; Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992); (c) in tasks containing mostly noncorresponding distractors; (d) for items mostly paired with noncorresponding distractors; and (e) when an item is presented in a context associated with noncorresponding distractors
Summary
A moth might have no choice but to circle the light but we, as humans, are generally able to inhibit a prepotent but detrimental action in favor of one better suited to our current goals—at least to some extent. Interference magnitude varies between individuals, and varies systematically with task context: Typically, interference effects are reduced (suggesting more efficient inhibition) (a) when a second goal-noncorresponding distractor is present within the same trial; (b) when a goal-noncorresponding distractor was present on the immediately preceding trial (Gratton or congruency sequence effect [CSE]; Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992); (c) in tasks containing mostly noncorresponding distractors; (d) for items mostly paired with noncorresponding distractors; and (e) when an item is presented in a context associated with noncorresponding distractors (list-wide, item-specific, and contextspecific proportion congruency effects for c– e, respectively; see Bugg & Crump, 2012) At first glance, these results appear to form a compellingly simple and coherent pattern: Inhibitory efficiency increases whenever inhibitory demands are high (due to currently, recently, or typically appearing noncorresponding distractors), and decreases— or “relaxes”—in less demanding situations. Even fundamental questions have not yet been resolved, such as whether inhibitory control (i.e., control of inhibitory processes) really is a strategic top-down “decision” or rather an associative bottom-up “consequence” (e.g., Egner, 2017), whether it is a unitary function or a set of independent, domain-specific processes (e.g., Cohen, 2017), and whether it is a specific response to “conflict” (noncorrespondence) or a general adaptation to any context (e.g., Schlaghecken & Martini, 2012)
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