Abstract
We construct a measure of analyst-level distraction based on analysts’ exposure to exogenous attention-grabbing events affecting firms under coverage. We find that temporarily distracted analysts achieve lower forecast accuracy, revise forecasts less frequently, and publish less informative forecast revisions relative to non-distracted analysts. Further, at the firm level, analyst distraction carries real negative externalities by increasing information asymmetry for stocks that suffer from a larger extent of analyst distraction during a given quarter. Our findings thus augment our understanding of the determinants and effects of analyst effort allocation and broaden the literature on distraction and information spillover in financial markets.
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