When an Exchange Semester Is No Longer Enough: Why and How the Bologna-Reforms Changed the Behavior of High-Ability Students?

Abstract

Emphasizing the existence of information asymmetries between, e.g., young academics and potential employers, signaling theory has shaped our understanding of how high-ability students try to document their superior skills in a competitive environment such as the labor market: high-ability individuals benefit from a relative cost advantage compared to low-ability individuals when producing a credible signal of superior ability. When this cost advantage decreases, the signal’s value also decreases. We analyze how the signal ‘international qualification’ has changed due to increasing overall student mobility, driven by the effect of a massive change in the institutional framework, namely the implementation of the Bologna reforms. Using a large and hitherto not accessible dataset with detailed information on 9096 German high-ability students, we find that following the Bologna reforms, high-ability students extended their stays and completed degrees abroad (instead of doing exchange semesters). No such changes in behavior are to be observed in the overall student population. We conclude that completing a degree abroad is the new labor market signal for the ‘international qualification’ of high-ability students.