Abstract
Traditional arguments against the identification of the language of thought with natural language assume a picture of natural language which is largely inconsistent with that suggested by contemporary linguistic theory. This has led certain philosophers and linguists to suggest that this identification is not as implausible as it once seemed. In this paper, I discuss the prospects for such an identification in light of these developments in linguistic theory. I raise a new challenge against the identification thesis: the existence of ungrammatical but acceptable expressions seems to require a gap between thought and language. I consider what must be the case in order for this objection to be dealt with.
Highlights
Fodor (1975) introduced into contemporary philosophy of psychology the idea that cognition occurs in a language-like medium
Traditional arguments against the identification of the language of thought with natural language assume a picture of natural language which is largely inconsistent with that suggested by contemporary linguistic theory
Having a thought is tokening an expression of natural language, and token thoughts are individuated by their linguistic properties
Summary
Fodor (1975) introduced into contemporary philosophy of psychology the idea that cognition occurs in a language-like medium. This proposal leads naturally to the question of the relation between this proposed language of thought and natural languages, like English or Quechua, with which we are familiar. Having a thought is tokening an expression of natural language, and token thoughts are individuated by their linguistic properties. Despite this simplicity, the view that we ought identify. It benefited greatly from discussion of numerous participants at the New York Philosophy of Language Workshop. Special thanks to two anonymous referees for this journal for their unusually detailed and well-researched comments
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