What Would Delegates Do? When and Why the Delegate Paradox Matters

Abstract

The consensus that American politicians are more ideologically extreme than voters has been challenged by the observation that issue delegates---who adopt voters' majority position on each issue---can be more extreme than the median voter. We deepen understanding of this by showing that it is conditional. Issue delegates are much more extreme than the median voter in left- and right-leaning constituencies, but not in evenly divided or ideologically purist constituencies. Consequently, the delegate paradox (1) matters most under conditions that have recently emerged in American politics, but (2) still cannot explain the disconnect between legislators and evenly-divided constituencies like states and competitive House districts. We verify these implications by replicating and extending two prominent studies. Although issue delegates representing full states are not much more extreme than the median voter, party issue delegates have moved to the extremes at nearly twice the rate of party median voters and are just as extreme as legislators.