What UN Principles? A U.S. Debate on Iraq

Abstract

The quality and depth of the broad public debate in the United States before Washington loosed its military might on Iraq suggests the internalization of international norms in American political life is remarkably thin. Although no survey data are immediately available evaluates the performance and resonance of the message conveyed by the mass media, little more than tactical appraisals were visible even while the Security Council was actively engaged in debate. Not once did I encounter a popular article or broadcast called attention to the obligation to settle disputes peacefully and the prohibition on the use of force in international relations contained in Article 2 (pars. 3 and 4) of the UN Charter. This prohibition stands except in circumstances when the Security Council authorizes measures deemed appropriate to address a breach or threat to the peace (Chapter VII). Occasionally some commentator remarked preventive violence was new in the UN context, but the limitations on self-defense, found in Article 51, which member states are obliged to observe, was never mentioned. Nor was the difference between the conciliatory aims in Chapter VI and the coercive exceptions given much attention. And even more fundamentally, the obligations the U.S. government assumed in ratifying the charter's provisions as part of its own public law never got more than an inaudible whisper. Yet as anyone who has worked in a governmental milieu knows, the first point of reference in policy formulation is the public law because it provides the foundation for both goals and methods. The UN Charter, moreover, sets out an agreed procedure to maintain international peace and security. It provides an understood and universally applicable public law to which governments are beholden. None of this thinking has to be invented anew. The charter is more concrete than concepts of just war, with their heavy philosophical baggage, and more worldly than prayer. Nevertheless, outside of specialist publications and conferences, Washington's complaints against Iraq presented to the Security Council and the process followed were treated as a question of win or lose--as if it involved merely tactical concerns brought before a village council. During his frenetic campaigning before the November 2002 election, President George Bush challenged the Council, Show the world whether you've got the backbone necessary to enforce your edicts. (1) Moreover, as the public discussion concentrated on tactics, it gave the impression a mere majority vote in the Security Council would be able substantially to affect the announced U.S. strategy in Iraq. This ignores the essential facts of the UN process. Among those procedural realities are the existence of the veto (a cautionary device originated by Washington to safeguard its national interests as well as to demonstrate the solidarity of the strongest powers) and the implications of voting on the basis of what members regarded as their sovereign right to determine what constitutes an imminent threat. It became immediately apparent a majority of members of the Security Council would be, at the very least, reluctant to back U.S. leadership. This was unmistakable during the involved diplomatic dance resulted in Resolution 1441 in November 2002. Later, the bilateral diplomatic machinery began to whir at full speed in pursuit of the famous second resolution, which one assumed would sanction military force. The press reported in late February 2003 President Bush still intended to go to war without this resolution. U.S. diplomats began telling Security Council members that a military attack is inevitable and any attempt to delay would destroy United Nations' credibility. (2) The president also telephoned heads of governments, especially those of the permanent members, to seek their support. Typically, such reports as well as editorial comment, even in serious newspapers, never mentioned the explicit constraints of the charter. …