Abstract

Mackie (Ethics: inventing right and wrong, Penguin Books, London, 1977) famously argued for a moral error theory on the basis that objective moral values, if they existed, would be very queer entities. Unfortunately, his argument is very brief and it is not totally obvious from what he says exactly where the queerness of moral values is supposed to lie. In this paper I will firstly show why a typical interpretation of Mackie is problematic and secondly offer a new interpretation. I will argue that, whether or not we have reason to live in the morally correct way, what seems queer about moral properties is that there is a morally correct way in which to live in the first place. This interpretation makes sense of Mackie’s claim that theism might be able to solve the queerness problem; the notion of an objectively correct way to live may make sense if theism is true, but not otherwise.

Highlights

  • Mackie (1977) famously argued for a moral error theory on the basis that objective moral values, if they existed, would be very queer entities

  • I will argue in Sect. 5, that there is another way in which we could interpret ‘providing a direction’, such that theism might be able to resolve the queerness problem; and so Mackie’s claim that theism might resolve the queerness problem suggests that this interpretation may well be what Mackie had in mind

  • If the queerness of moral properties lies in the fact that they provide us with irreducibly normative reasons a moral realist might point to a ‘companion in guilt’

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Summary

Introduction

Mackie (1977) famously argued for a moral error theory on the basis that objective moral values, if they existed, would be very queer entities His argument is very brief and it is not totally obvious from what he says exactly where the queerness of moral values is supposed to lie. 5, I will argue that if there are objective moral properties there must be an objectively correct or prescribed way to live, and that it is this which, on the face of it, seems queer, irrespective of whether or not we have a normative reason to live in the correct or prescribed way This interpretation makes sense of Mackie’s claim that theism might be able to solve the queerness problem; the notion of an objectively correct or prescribed way to live may be plausible if theism is true, but not otherwise

Mackie’s Queerness Argument
Irreducible Normativity
Moral Error Theory and Epistemic Error Theory
The Real Queerness of Morality
Conclusion
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