What Second‐Best Epistemology Could Be

Abstract

ABSTRACTAccording to the Theory of the Second Best, in non‐ideal circumstances, approximating ideals might be suboptimal (with respect to a specific interpretation of what “approximating an ideal” means). In this paper, I argue that the formal model underlying the Theory can apply to problems in epistemology. Two applications are discussed: First, in some circumstances, second‐best problems arise in Bayesian settings. Second, the division of epistemic labor can be subject to second‐best problems. These results matter. They allow us to evaluate the claim, made by many philosophers, that second‐best problems have import in epistemology (and the specific conditions under which the Theory finds applications). They also allow us to see that talk of “approximating an ideal” is ambiguous, and to clarify the conditions in which approximating an epistemic ideal might be beneficial.