What Russia Must Do to Fight Organized Crime

Abstract

Most analysts explain the persistence of organized crime in Russia as result of corrupt government officials who protect major crime bosses and hinder law enforcement attempts to investigate and prosecute organizations. Although official corruption is undoubtedly major factor, such analyses ignore other, no less important, obstacles, many of which are embedded in the Russian legal system itself. Beginning with the passage of the Organized Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the United States has developed complex legal structure which, by providing law enforcement with the tools needed to investigate and prosecute organized crime, has resulted in the weakening of La Cosa Nostra. Russia, however, lacks corresponding laws.On the basis of the U.S. experience, Kenneth Lowrie, deputy chief of the United States Department of Justice Organized Crime and Racketeering section, has identified five elements necessary to an effective antiorganized crime program. These are (1) statutes that allow for the prosecution of as whole, (2) laws that allow for the use of confidential informants and undercover operations, (3) laws that facilitate the use of cooperating witness testimony in court proceedings, (4) laws that permit electronic surveillance and the use of wiretap evidence in court proceedings, and (5) an effective witness protection program.1 A comparative analysis of relevant Russian laws in light of these elements reveals that Russia's legal base is woefully inadequate to combat organized crime and is likely as much of an obstacle to the eradication of organized crime in Russia as is official corruption.Enterprise Theory of ProsecutionThe U.S. Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Title 18, U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., passed in 1970, facilitates the prosecution of organized crime by allowing prosecutors to join multiple defendants and multiple crimes in single case if the defendants and crimes are all connected to the same enterprise. Without such law, defendants in single organization would be prosecuted separately for separate By contrast, joining defendants and crimes in single case allows prosecutors to present to judges and juries complete picture of the defendants' activity.In 1996, Russia added Article 210 (Organization of Criminal Society) to its Criminal Code, which, like RICO, purports to facilitate enterprise prosecutions. Specifically, Article 210 criminalizes the creation of or participation in a ('criminal organization') [established] for the commission of serious or especially serious crimes. However, very few cases are actually prosecuted under this statute. The ineffectiveness of Article 210 appears to be the result of several factors.2 First, Article 210 is poorly drafted and fails to provide workable definition of criminal society. RICO defines racketeering as individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not legal entity, engaged in of racketeering [18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)]. RICO further specifies that a pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two of racketeering within ten-year period and provides list of crimes that constitute acts of racketeering [18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) and 1961(4)]. By contrast, Article 210 provides no definition of criminal society. A commentary to Article 210 refers to Article 35, the general definitional section of the Russian Criminal Code.3 However, Article 35 provides little help and states only that a crime is considered to have been committed by ('criminal organization') if it is committed by unified group (organization), which has been created for the commission of serious or especially serious . In other words, the Russian Criminal Code's definition of criminal society is entirely circular. …