Abstract

The aim of this article is to explore the motivations of street-level bureaucrats when implementing change initiated by elected politicians. We analyse experimental data on more than 1,800 local civil servants from all 243 local governments in South Korea and find that street-level bureaucrats are more likely to implement change instigated by local elected politicians when their own policy positions are reflected in the reforms. Moreover, the degree to which street-level bureaucrats are likely to execute reforms instigated by local politicians is greater when bureaucrats perceive themselves as having more freedom to exercise discretion. These findings reveal a behavioural insight into the conditions in which bureaucrats are more likely to respond to change championed by elected politicians versus conditions where they are more likely to follow existing rules in the policy implementation process.

Highlights

  • Bureaucratic organisations are often expected to run according to rules (Crozier, 1964; Weber, 1974)

  • Lipsky’s (1980/2010) seminal work suggests that the discretion granted to street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) and their relative autonomy from principals create room to be filled by their own decisions which, in turn, are influenced by street-level factors

  • In this article, we seek to broaden our understanding of how SLBs respond to elected politicians’ policy change

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Summary

Introduction

Bureaucratic organisations are often expected to run according to rules (Crozier, 1964; Weber, 1974). We investigate conditions where SLBs are more responsive to elected politicians’ policy change versus those where they are more likely to abide by existing rules in local governments’ policy implementation. Building on the theories of SLBs’ implementation and the relationship between elected politicians and SLBs, we examine how the congruence of political ideology between governors/mayors and SLBs and the degree of discretion SLBs perceive affect the implementation of these politicians’ new policy or policy change.. SLBs are more likely to implement their elected politicians’ policy change when the latter’s political ideology is more congruent with their own than when it is incongruent, controlling for several characteristics of governors/mayors and bureaucrats.

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