Abstract

AbstractTeleological thinking about money reasons from what money is for to both how it ought to be used and what forms it should take. One type, found in Aristotle’s argument against usury, takes teleological considerations alone to decisively settle normative questions. Another type, found in Locke’s argument about monetary durability, takes teleological considerations to contribute to the settling of normative questions, but sees them as one consideration among many. This paper endorses the type made by Locke while rejecting the type made by Aristotle, and identifies further teleological tendencies in the work of Adam Smith and other philosophers.

Highlights

  • Philosophical thinking about money often proceeds teleologically

  • The major flaw with Aristotle’s argument against usury was its inflexible insistence that teleology alone always delivers decisive normative reasons, regardless of other considerations. If this commitment is softened to acknowledge the way that teleological claims can contribute to decisive normative reasons in some cases but not in others, we find a type of teleological argument that could be compelling

  • While this paper cannot carry out this work here and it provides tools to guide such future work by distinguishing between two types of teleological arguments about money that have already been made

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Summary

Introduction

Philosophical thinking about money often proceeds teleologically. That is, it reasons from what money is for to both how it ought to be used and what forms it can and ought to take. One type of teleological argument, exemplified by Aristotle’s influential argument against usury, takes teleological considerations to always offer decisive normative reasons. Another type, one that can be found in one of John Locke’s discussions of money, finds teleological considerations compelling, but only in combination with other facts and practical considerations. Dick endorsing the sorts like those made by Locke This is not to say that the paper argues for Locke’s conclusions about how money should be used and fashioned; it is only to say that Locke’s form of teleological argument is potentially compelling while Aristotle’s is not. A single paper is no place to settle all the questions about these other authors’ views, so it instead identifies these teleological tendencies as a direction for future scholarship, which could use the framework of the two types of teleological arguments as a guide for how those views might be interpreted or should be developed

Aristotle on Money and Usury
Two Types of Teleology
Locke on Money and Preservation
Teleological Tendencies
Smith on Money and Exchange
Modern Limits on What Money Can Be
Conclusion
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