What is wrong with conspiracy beliefs?

Abstract

The majority of psychological research highlights the role of lapses in rational thinking as a significant contributing factor to conspiracy beliefs (CBs). However, historical examples demonstrate that not all CBs are inherently incorrect. In this paper, we propose a more nuanced approach, suggesting that instead of universally labelling CBs as false or adopting an agnostic stance towards their veracity, it is beneficial to assess the plausibility of each CB individually along a continuum. To achieve this, we recommend utilizing two key indicators: (1) the prior probability of a specific conspiracy theory being true, considered independently of any supporting or contradicting evidence, and (2) the extent to which proponents of a CB demonstrate actively open-minded thinking. We delve into the rationale behind employing such a nuanced approach to evaluating CB plausibility and present several strategies for calculating and integrating plausibility ratings within conspiracy research. Consistent with our proposed framework, we argue that conspiracy researchers possess both the capability and responsibility to differentiate certain CBs as comparatively more irrational than others, provided that such differentiation is based on principled and probabilistic grounds.