What is Wrong with (Animal) Rights?

Abstract

Philosophical debates over the status of animals have exploded such that a survey of the literature is overwhelming. With the exception of a few Continental philosophers, a gander makes it clear that today most philosophers discussing animals still do so in terms of animal suffering or animal intelligence, which in turn leads to discussions of animal rights or animal welfare. 1 Most of these discussions revolve around the ways in which animals are—or are not—like us and therefore should—or should not—be treated like us. Throughout this literature, animal rights are likened to (or distinguished from) civil rights for women and people of color. What these philosophers do not consider when developing analogies between women and animals is that the exploitation and denigration of people tradition- ally involve viewing them as animals, treating them like animals, and justifying their inferior status on the basis of their supposed animality or proximity to the animal. This was (and is) the case with women, who traditionally have been considered closer to nature and to animals, especially in their reproductive and child-rearing functions. This was the case with slaves, who were treated like cattle or oxen to be bought, sold, and used on plantations. This was (and is) the case with people of color who have been stereotyped as hypersexual, immoral, or irrational like animals. The proximity between oppressed peoples and animals is not just a contingency of history but a central part of Western conceptions of man, human , and animal . 2 As a result, overcoming the denigration of oppressed peoples, and revaluing them on their own terms, may require attention to the man-animal opposition as it has operated within the history of Western thought.