What is this thing called autism? A critical analysis of the tenacious search for autism's essence

Abstract

Currently, autism is a widespread and diverse neurodevelopmental disorder that includes both severely impaired and institutionalized patients and the fairly geeky but brilliant university professor. Despite its heterogeneity, autism is often presented as a distinct nosological entity with a unifying autism essence. In this article, I will argue that the common belief about the ontological status of autism is that autism constitutes a natural kind. There are, however, two major problems with a natural kind approach in autism research. First, how can we continue to speak about autism as a distinct disease while the condition is marked by such sheer diversity of symptoms, traits, biological markers and cognitive profiles? And second, recent historical works on autism illustrate that there is something fundamentally social and historical about how autism is defined, diagnosed and treated. I will argue that the dominant natural kind approach in autism research is misguided, as autism can only be understood in relation to ideas about what kind of behavior is deviant and in need of correction or support. Furthermore, locating and maintaining autism within the biological realm of the individual obscures an array of social, cultural and psychological issues in understanding the contemporary phenomenon we call autism.