What Is Scientific Criticism for? Some Philosophical Reflections on Criticism and Evidence within the Scientific Ethos

Abstract

In this chapter, Füger and Özmen analyze the concepts of evidence and criticism, and their legitimating functions in scientific debates. On the one hand, criticism is a key element of scientific inquiry. On the other hand, evidence is necessary – albeit not sufficient – for a scientific activity to be acknowledged within the scientific community and society in general. Scientific criticism in general and the contestation of evidence in particular is built on a shared conception of evidence. By embracing the perspective of evidence agnosticism, the authors explore the normative conditions of evidence practices within a scientific ethos. They hold that criticism and evidence are to be understood as both the basis and the result of epistemic and normative negotiations. Evidence practices are closely linked to social normative processes that have an impact on the self-image of scientists as well as on trust in scientific institutions. Trust and criticism are compatible with each other, both within science and between science and society. The authors conclude that criticism, the ambiguity of evidence and contingencies are key aspects of scientific practice and hence a stabilizing factor for science.