Abstract

This article examines a paradox that relates to the issue of homicide in Russia. On the one hand, official police statistics demonstrate a rapid decline in the homicide rate in Russia in the 2000s, which is consistent with the stable economic growth (in particular after the financial crisis of 1998) and a stable political environment during the presidency of Vladimir Putin. On the other hand, other conditions and processes (e.g. rampant corruption, predatory policing, political repressions, state violence against businesses, rising xenophobia and apathy) point to what Norbert Elias terms a ‘decivilizing process’, which is expected to be associated with a less precipitous decline in homicide or stable homicide rate in this period. In fact, newly available homicide estimates suggest that the homicide rate was higher than and did not decline at a pace suggested by the official police and mortality sources in the 2000s. Hence, this article has two main objectives. First, it discusses issues around homicide statistics in Russia and argues that the newly available homicide estimates represent the more accurate statistics. Second, it explores decivilizing process theory as a potential framework for explaining a high and steady homicide rate in Russia in the 2000s.

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