What Is Rational and Irrational in Human Decision Making

Emmanuel M Pothos,Oliver J Waddup,James M Yearsley,Prince Kouassi

doi:10.3390/quantum3010014

Abstract

There has been a growing trend to develop cognitive models based on the mathematics of quantum theory. A common theme in the motivation of such models has been findings which apparently challenge the applicability of classical formalisms, specifically ones based on classical probability theory. Classical probability theory has had a singularly important place in cognitive theory, because of its (in general) descriptive success but, more importantly, because in decision situations with low, equivalent stakes it offers a multiply justified normative standard. Quantum cognitive models have had a degree of descriptive success and proponents of such models have argued that they reveal new intuitions or insights regarding decisions in uncertain situations. However, can quantum cognitive models further benefit from normative justifications analogous to those for classical probability models? If the answer is yes, how can we determine the rational status of a decision, which may be consistent with quantum theory, but inconsistent with classical probability theory? In this paper, we review the proposal from Pothos, Busemeyer, Shiffrin, and Yearsley (2017), that quantum decision models benefit from normative justification based on the Dutch Book Theorem, in exactly the same way as models based on classical probability theory.

Highlights

The justification for the rational status of classical probability theory can be established through multiple routes [1,2,3]
Even though we will shortly focus on the conjunction fallacy, we note that quantum cognitive models have been pursued across a range of applications
The quantum model for the conjunction fallacy should make it clear that what looks like a conjunction fallacy can be allowed within quantum theory, that is, quantum theory allows situations where Prob(A) < Prob(A & B)

Summary

Introduction

Academic Editors: Graciela Chichilnisky, Peter Eisenberger, Emmanuel Haven and Andrei Khrennikov. Part of the reason why this research has been so influential is because the corresponding results appear so surprising, given the established standards for rationality Regarding the latter, the predominant framework for rational decision making in behavioural sciences has been classical probability theory. To see a difference of almost 20% as a result of a simple question order change provides a bleak perspective for the reliability of poll results and their capacity to provide measures of public attitudes which are unbiased or resistant to manipulation One response to such a result is that poll responding might be reflexive or non-analytic [10,11] and so in such cases apparent classical fallacies reflect decision makers’ lack of engagement with the task. Before this, we consider whether there are ways to salvage classical explanations of results such as the ones

Classical Accounts for Decision Fallacies?

Quantum Decision Models

Rationality in the Conjunction Fallacy?

Concluding Comments