What Is Nietzschean Nihilism?

Abstract

In this chapter, I examine three recent accounts of Nietzschean nihilism: those of Van Tongeren (Friedrich Nietzsche and European Nihilism. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018), Reginster (The Affirmation of Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), and Huddleston (Philosopher’s Imprint 19 (11): 1–19, 2019). Though each of these accounts serves as a crucial addition to the scholarship on Nietzschean nihilism, I argue below that none of them, taken alone, offers a wholly satisfying account of that in which Nietzschean nihilism consists. While Reginster and Van Tongeren each offer an account illuminating a particular form of Nietzschean nihilism, thus construing the problem of nihilism too narrowly, Huddleston’s account is overly broad. By aiming to offer “a unifying thread linking together the main forms of nihilism [Nietzsche] targets,” Huddleston succeeds at presenting an accurate and somewhat illuminating answer, but fails to offer a sufficiently robust account. Thus, his interpretation requires supplementing.