What is Nietzsche’s genealogical critique of morality?

Abstract

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I examine the method behind Nietzsche’s genealogical critique. I do not offer a comprehensive characterization and defense of his execution of this critique, but I sometimes allude to elements of it in order to illustrate its method. I review versions of genealogical critique that consist in challenging the epistemic standing of moral judgments (their justification or their truth) by exposing their historical contingency. I argue that they misconstrue Nietzschean genealogy, which is best conceived as a pragmatic enterprise, which aims at uncovering their function and asking whether they are useful or harmful. I argue that such a pragmatic conception of genealogy accounts for its peculiar combination of history and fiction. I then show how this pragmatic view of moral judgments fulfills Nietzsche’s ambition to develop a compelling naturalistic conception of them and explain the importance he ascribes to a functional critique of them. I conclude by considering two questions this pragmatic conception of genealogy poses for its critical bearing: How can moral judgments best explained in terms of their functional usefulness turn out to be harmful? Since Nietzsche believes that any practice, including morality, has multiple functions, how is a functional critique of morality even possible?