What is Music? The Ontological Status of Musical Works

Michael Pipko

doi:10.7710/2155-4838.1172

Abstract

The ontological status of musical works is a controversial topic among those in the field. This paper aims to argue for a nominalist and non-reductive approach to musical works that differentiates musical works from the sound structures commonly equated with them. The difference between sound structures and musical works is heavily emphasized and I conclude that musical works have emergent attributes sound structures do not. These attributes being creatability, fine individuation, and the inclusion of performance means. After establishing this I begin to build an argument for a nonreductive approach to musical works by rejecting the extreme view held by compositional nihilists. Once I establish that musical works are entities in our ontology I argue against them being abstract. I end by defending the nominalist approach.

Highlights

Pipko | 91 are properties of objects, of a sounding body? This is the view supported by Locke, referred to as the Object-Property View of sounds
Asserting that musical works are a higher-level kind that exist as non-abstract entities intuitively seems to be a tenable approach to the ontological status of musical works
Is there a parsimonious method of integrating the features we ascribe to musical works into our ontology? Levinson offers three important criteria worth considering: creatability, fine individuation, and the inclusion of performance means

Summary

Introduction

Pipko | 91 are properties of objects, of a sounding body? This is the view supported by Locke, referred to as the Object-Property View of sounds. Asserting that musical works are a higher-level kind that exist as non-abstract entities intuitively seems to be a tenable approach to the ontological status of musical works. On this approach sounds are like colors, they exist as either a stable or transient property of an object.

Objectives

Results

Conclusion