Abstract

Any successful naturalistic account of consciousness must state what consciousness is, in terms that are compatible with the rest of our naturalistic descriptions of the world. Integrated Information Theory represents a pioneering attempt to do just this. This theory accounts for the core features of consciousness by holding that there is an equivalence between the phenomenal experience associated with a system and its intrinsic causal power. The proposal, however, fails to provide insight into the qualitative character of consciousness and, as a result of its proposed equivalence between consciousness and purely internal dynamics, into the intentional character of conscious perception. In recent years, an alternate group of theories has been proposed that claims consciousness to be equivalent to certain forms of inference. One such theory is the Living Mirror theory, which holds consciousness to be a form of inference performed by all living systems. The proposal of consciousness as inference overcomes the shortcomings of Integrated Information Theory, particularly in the case of conscious perception. A synthesis of these two perspectives can be reached by appreciating that conscious living systems are self-organising in nature. This mode of organization requires them to have a high level of integration. From this perspective, we can understand consciousness as being dependent on a system possessing non-trivial amounts of integrated information while holding that the process of inference performed by the system is the fact of consciousness itself.

Highlights

  • An explanatory gap currently exists in our scientific understanding of the world [1].On one side of this gap are our third-person objective descriptions of physical phenomena.On the other side are our first-person subjective descriptions of our conscious experience.In order to close this gap, we need a theory of what consciousness is that can be stated in objective physical terms

  • Can inference-based theories account for the phenomenal axioms of Information Theory (IIT)? (1) The intrinsic existence of consciousness, the fact that it exists from its own side, can readily be accounted for by the autopoietic nature of living systems [9]

  • While it is not itself equivalent to consciousness, a physical system that is capable of instantiating the kind of inference that we might hold to be equivalent to consciousness must have a high level of integrated information, otherwise it would not be able to function as an autopoietic system

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Summary

Introduction

An explanatory gap currently exists in our scientific understanding of the world [1]. It has been proposed that this process may lay the foundations for consciousness in complex creatures like ourselves [10,11] or that it may be the basis of consciousness in all living systems [12] This family of theories will be described here as inference-based theories. We can ask whether they account for features of consciousness in a way that is intuitively satisfying While this approach is complicated by the potential fallibility of our intuitions and the fact that the natural world is under no obligation to be intuitively intelligible to us, the intuitive explanatory power of scientific theories inevitably plays a key role in how theories of emergent phenomena reach widespread acceptance

Integrated Information Theory
Inference-Based Theories
Can Inference-Based Theories Account for the Axioms of IIT?
Combining Integrated Information and Inference
Conclusions
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