Abstract
Abstract This paper considers the nature of academic judgement. It also suggests that academic judgement is not the special preserve of academics as such and is something with which students can be imbued. It is further suggested that academic judgement is best considered in the context of critical learning which is contrasted with demonstrative learning. The paper then proceeds with an analysis of judgement by considering the ideas of Peter Geach on this particular subject. It then moves to considering judgement in the context of a practice, as set out by Alasdair MacIntyre. Whilst providing insight into the nature of practical judgement, this approach is found wanting nonetheless and attention is next turned to considering judgement within the space of reasons – that is, the approach of John McDowell. The paper then suggests that the idea of the space of reasons can be given greater substance through consideration of two further kinds of judgement – epistemic and reflective.
Highlights
Academics make academic1 judgements virtually every working day
What exactly is an academic judgement? As a starting point, one might have recourse to appropriate statutory documents: for example, the 2004 Education Act mentions that student complaints do not count as a ‘qualifying’ complaint if it relates to matters pertaining to an ‘academic judgement’ (HEA, 2004, p. 5, Section 12)
The idea of a space of reasons has been brought into prominence by John McDowell who was concerned to identify a space for human spontaneity of thought and judgement without making it wholly autonomous, external to the world
Summary
This paper considers the nature of academic judgement. It is further suggested that academic judgement is best considered in the context of critical learning which is contrasted with demonstrative learning. The paper proceeds with an analysis of judgement by considering the ideas of Peter Geach on this particular subject. It moves to considering judgement in the context of a practice, as set out by Alasdair MacIntyre. Whilst providing insight into the nature of practical judgement, this approach is found wanting and attention is turned to considering judgement within the space of reasons – that is, the approach of John McDowell. The paper suggests that the idea of the space of reasons can be given greater substance through consideration of two further kinds of judgement – epistemic and reflective
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