Abstract

This article explores the settling and unsettling of legal concepts in relation to refugee-status determination. To gain admission to the United States, asylum seekers are required to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of one of five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Accordingly, many political asylum claims turn on the interpretation of “particular social group.” This article examines case law disputes in the federal courts of appeals over the meaning of that phrase and describes how statutory interpretation by judges has contributed to the persistence of such disputes over several decades since the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act. My analysis reveals the tensions between different forms of rationality at play in judicial statutory interpretation and applies the concept of legal settling to a new empirical domain.

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