Abstract
This essay offers a programmatic statement for a realist theory of law. Although I have been influenced by (and written about) the work of earlier American, Scandinavian, Italian and other legal realists, this is not an essay about what others have thought. This is an essay about what I take realism about law to mean and what its theoretical commitments are; I shall use other realists to sometimes illustrate the distinctive positions of a realist theory of law, but will make clear where I depart from them. A realist theory of law involves both a “realist” and a “naturalistic” perspective on law. Let me explain how I understand these perspectives.
Highlights
This essay offers a programmatic statement for a realist theory of law
“Realism” describes a theoretical outlook that is no longer fashionable in the universities, and one that has nothing to do with the metaphysical doctrine picked out by the same word
Because realism means understanding reality, realists are necessarily “naturalists” in the following precise sense: in describing and explaining what is really going on they rely only on those mechanisms and entities that are explanatorily fruitful in the successful empirical sciences
Summary
This essay offers a programmatic statement for a realist theory of law. I have been influenced by (and written about) the work of earlier American, Scandinavian, Italian and other legal realists, this is not an essay about what others have thought.
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