Abstract

Dreaming is held to consist of three elements: periodic, unrelated visual bursts, emotional episodes, and the cognitive synthesis of the first two. The theory predicts that there are two kinds of visual imagery in dreams: one vivid, detailed, colorful, large and in the center of the visual field. The other less vivid, less detailed, less colorful, smaller, and in the periphery. These vivid events should be unconstrained by the plot, and the less vivid ones constrained. Evidence is presented that this is so. The theory is consistent with the incongruence of events in dreaming, with the transmogrification of images and setting and with the incorporation of external intrusions. The theory predicts consistent individual differences in how tightly or loosely images are integrated into a plot in dreaming, and that this should correspond to the ability to tie random images together into a plot while awake. Evidence is presented that this is so. The theory suggests why causality is linear in dreaming, specifies the psychological differences between dreaming and waking, and between REM and nonREM sleep, and comments on the notion of ‘scene’ and the ability to ‘control’ dream content. Finally the theory suggests that the cognitive synthesis is the most likely place to find the ‘meaning’ of dream.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call