What (If Anything) Can Justify Basic Income Experiments? Balancing Costs and Benefits in Terms of Justice

Josette Daemen

doi:10.1515/bis-2021-0024

Abstract

Abstract The central thesis of this essay is that basic income experiments are justified if their expected benefits in terms of justice exceed their expected costs in terms of justice. The benefits are a function of basic income’s effect on the level of justice attained in the context in which it is implemented, and the experiment’s impact on future policy-making. The costs comprise the sacrifices made as a result of the experiment’s interventional character, as well as the study’s opportunity costs. In light of the proposed standard of justification for basic income experiments, the factors that play a role in it, and the way these interact with one another, this essay provides some practical recommendations for researchers hoping to conduct such an experiment.

Highlights

Twenty-five years have passed since Van Parijs (1995) asked a question that would gain wide fame in the world of political philosophy: “what can justify capitalism?” The answer he gave to this question, would become famous even beyond the political philosophy community: the institution of an unconditional basic income (UBI)
What can justify basic income experiments? I have suggested that basic income experiments are justified if their expected benefits exceed their expected costs, both measured in terms of justice
What does this mean for researchers hoping to carry out a UBI experiment? I have recommended that those who want to make their experiment pass the threshold for justification, firstly, opt for a version of the basic income likely to contribute substantially to the realisation of the values they associate with the term “justice”

Summary

Introduction

Twenty-five years have passed since Van Parijs (1995) asked a question that would gain wide fame in the world of political philosophy: “what (if anything) can justify capitalism?” The answer he gave to this question, would become famous even beyond the political philosophy community: the institution of an unconditional basic income (UBI). The idea has been around for longer, but over the past quarter of a century the interest in UBI has surged to unprecedented levels both among academics and the wider public. Looking at the extensive theoretical literature on UBI, one could say that most contributions revolve around the question: “what (if anything) can justify basic income?” In answering this question, both positively and negatively, political philosophers have considered UBI in light of a wide range of different values: freedom, equality, reciprocity, and democracy, to name only a few. The obvious solution would be to set up basic income experiments designed so as to yield the data necessary for testing the hypotheses that we are interested in. Such an experimental approach invites yet another question to be phrased in familiar terms: “what (if anything) can justify basic income experiments?” It is to this question that this essay proposes an answer. The section that follows introduces and rebuts two criticisms of this paper’s proposal, before the final section concludes

Justifying Basic Income Experiments

Criticisms

Conclusion