Abstract
The paper investigates two faces of unions: a bargainer with employers, and an employer in its own right. We develop parallel models of union-owned and private unionized firms and employ a sample of Israeli manufacturing firms to test various hypotheses. We conclude that: (1) union-owned firms do not behave very differently from their private sector counterparts; (2) higher wages in union-owned firms are associated with higher productivity rather than with systematic differences in weights attached to profits as against wages and employment in the two types of firms; (3) union ownership enhances enterprise productivity; and (4) wage and employment bargains do not lie on the demand curve; instead, efficient bargaining with a stronger emphasis on employment than on wages is found in both firm types.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
