What Follows?

Abstract

In the June 2001 special issue of this journal devoted to `Social Constructionism and Its Critics', some critics take (strong) constructionism to task for its many problems and internal contradictions-most notably, the failure of its advocates to acknowledge their own (ontological and epistemological) commitments and realism. Other critics attempt to save constructionism from these charges by finding a less strident form of realism-what I will call a `quasi-realism'-within constructionism. After examining Gergen's insistence that we attend not to the truth of any given discourse but rather to the question `what follows?' when we adopt any given discourse, I consider each critic's own view about what epistemology necessarily follows (and does not follow) from the ontological doctrine he or she seeks to defend. I focus my attention on the epistemological consequences, including the potential for fallibility/error, that follow from the investigation of those ontological entities understood to be human kinds, kinds that are mind-dependent in diverse ways and so must be understood with more ontological clarity. I conclude with discussion of the striving for transcendence (by way of defending some form of human agency) that often seems to fuel the constructionist campaign.