Abstract
Richard Feldman and Earl Conee advance the following argument: P1. Process Reliabilism is tenable only if it can provide a solution to the Generality Problem. P2. No solution to the Generality Problem exists. C. Process Reliabilism is untenable. I argue that this argument is unsound. Premise one is false; it depends on further internalist premises that the proponent of Process Reliabilism, a paradigmatically externalist theory of epistemic justification, can reject.
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