What does the „bedrock“ of rules consist of? Mcdowell on Kripke’s and Wright’s interpretation of Wittgenstein

Abstract

This text discusses McDowell?s position with regard to particular problems of Wittgenstein?s philosophy, primarily through his criticism of Saul Kripke?s and Crispin Wright?s interpretation of Wittgenstein?s understanding of rules. What these interpretations have in common are certain perspectives of the possibility of grasping rules, when the solution differs both from the explanation through interpretation and from the platonism of rules. According to McDowell, Kripke?s and Wright?s interpretation state that congruence of individuals and their behavior, that is, their use of language, comes before language norms and meanings. Normativity of linguistic rules is eliminated in this way, that is, it is compensated with description of current public use of language which basically does not follow Wittgenstein?s initial intention. Contrary to this, McDowell speaks about Wittgenstein?s emphasis placed on the autonomy of rules, as well as on the implicit normative basis of forms of life. The last part of the text considers justifiability of McDowell?s criticism of these two interpretations. It is also emphasized that beside the fact that particular objections referring to the importance of practice and interpretation are not sufficiently founded in writings of Kripke and Wright, there still is a significant criticism, which has substantially contributed to understanding Wittgenstein?s positions regarding rules and their practical basis.