Abstract
This article uses the Supreme Court's opinions in Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) to show the risks of silence in communication. Theories of rhetorical silence celebrate silences' communicative potential; yet, Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) offers rhetorical studies scholars an opportunity to examine the value of silence in a new situation, custodial interrogation. In Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) the Court ruled that, despite nearly three hours of silence during police interrogation, Thompkins's two short utterances constituted a confession, and waived his right to remain silent. This article analyzes Thompkins's silence, first, using rhetorical silence literature, which fails to explain why the Court did not recognize Thompkins's silence as communicative. Then, this article employs H. P. Grice's theory of conversational implicature, which examines ambiguous utterances, to explain how the Court interpreted Thompkins's silence. Reading the Court's opinions through Grice's theory of implicature demonstrates that theories of rhetorical silence hide the risks silence poses for some rhetors.
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