What does Malawi's Fertiliser Programme do to Private Sector Fertiliser Sales? A Quasi‐Experimental Field Study

Abstract

AbstractMalawi implemented reforms to its Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP) during the 2015/16 agricultural season that allowed certain large‐scale, private sector fertiliser dealers to sell subsidised fertiliser at their network of retail stores in select districts on a pilot basis. At the same time, small‐scale independent fertiliser dealers were excluded from participating in the pilot. We use a unique panel dataset of large‐scale corporate fertiliser dealers and small‐scale independent fertiliser dealers collected before and after the policy change to estimate the impacts of the FISP on those who participated in the pilot and those who did not, using a difference‐in‐differences estimator. Results indicate that large‐scale dealers who sold the FISP fertiliser under the pilot programme in 2015/16 did not have their commercial sales either crowded‐in or crowded‐out by the FISP pilot. Instead, the average volume of fertiliser sold at each of their retail stores increased by 59% due to an increase in subsidised fertiliser sales. Conversely, small‐scale independent fertiliser dealers who were not allowed participate in the pilot had their commercial sales crowded‐out by the programme. They experienced a 60% decline in the volume of commercial fertiliser sales on average at each store. This implies that the FISP reforms have mainly benefited large‐scale fertiliser dealers who sell 90% of the fertiliser in Malawi, but caused some harm to the many small‐scale independent fertiliser dealers who sell about 10% of the private sector's fertiliser in Malawi, but often operate their businesses in more remote areas.