What does it mean to make a moral claim? A Wittgensteinian approach to energy justice

Abstract

Recently an increasing number of studies have been developing the concept of ‘energy justice’. They explore local and global interconnections in energy production, supply and consumption and aim to present policymakers with a morally compelling case for shifting energy-related policies and practices toward greater fairness: locally, globally and across generations. They draw on various notions of justice but have not yet explored what it means to make a moral claim, i.e. on what basis moral obligations can be said to exist. Hence it is not clear what kind of appeal they are making to policymakers. Here I suggest an approach to moral claims informed by Wittgenstein’s philosophy could strengthen their approach. In this view, moral claims do not refer to objectively existing, universally applicable ethical truths, but nor are they merely statements of preference or affect. Instead, moral sensitivity is an essential element in the meaning of life for human beings, intrinsic to being a person. It develops through people’s lifelong involvement in communal practices, together with language about obligation and rightness/wrongness. Using this approach together with insights from pragmatist philosophers I suggest ways policymakers’ moral compass could be deepened and extended to respond more readily to energy justice concerns.