What do people think they're doing? Action identification and human behavior.

Abstract

Issues in the cognitive representation and control of action are broached from the perspective of action identification theory. This theory holds that any action can be identified in many ways, ranging from low-level identities that specify how the action is performed to high-level identities that signify why or with what effect the action is performed. The level of identification most likely to be adopted by an actor is said to be dictated by processes reflecting a trade-off between concerns for comprehen- sive action understanding and effective action maintenance. This means that the actor is always sensitive to contextual cues to higher levels of identification but moves to lower levels ofidentification if the action proves difficult to maintain with higher level identities in mind. These respective pro- cesses are documented empirically, as is their coordinated interplay in promoting a level of prepotent identification that matches the upper limits of the actor's capacity to perform the action. The im- plications of this analysis are developed for action stability, the psychology of performance impair- ment, personal versus situational causation, and the behavioral bases of self-understanding. People always seem to be doing something. They also seem for seemingly unbounded constructions of behavior. As philos- to be quite adept at identifying what they are doing. What is less ophers have long noted, any segment of behavior can be con- clear is how these two observations relate to one another. The sciously identified in many different ways (Anscombe, 1957; theory of action identification (Vallacher & Wegner, 1985; Weg- Austin, 1961; Danto, 1963; Goldman, 1970; Ryie, 1949; Witt- ner & Vallacher, 1986) is explicitly concerned with this issue. At genstein, 1953). Something as simple as meeting someone, the heart of the theory are three interacting processes that spec- for instance, could be recognized by anyone with an even mildly ify a causal interdependence between what people are doing and active mental life as being social, exchanging pleasantries, what they think they are doing. Through a delineation of these learning about someone new, revealing one's personality, processes, we hope to reveal how action constrains one's identi- or even uttering words. But while representations of action fication of action and, in turn, how action identification exerts a admit to considerable variability and seem subject to notewor- selecting and guiding force in subsequent action. The proposed thy change from moment to moment, behavior seems to follow causal interdependence between action and action identifica- a more constrained path, often exhibiting a press toward COIn- tion proves useful in understanding a host of issues in human pletion in the face of situational forces, biological needs, and psychology that center on the mental control of action. These reinforcement contingencies. Thus, as interesting as cognitive issues are thus discussed in detail, with attention given in each representations may be in their own right, they are considered case to the points of contact between our analysis and prior con- by many to operate independently of the causal mechanisms ceptualizations. We begin by reviewing the background and promoting overt action. principles of the theory.