Abstract
Hungary’s 2022 veto (since withdrawn) of the European Union’s proposal to adopt the global minimum tax under Pillar 2 shone a spotlight on the principle of unanimity that guides tax policymaking within the 27-member union. Natalia Pushkareva examines how the system that empowered Hungary’s veto fits within the “winner’s curse”, a theory that explains auction behaviour, and a corollary, the “unilateralist’s curse”. She explains why in an organization like the European Union, requiring unanimity may result in some actors overvaluing the benefits of a proposed policy.
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