Abstract
This article considers academic energy modelling as a scientific practice. While models and modelling have been of considerable interest in energy social science research, few studies have brought together approaches from philosophy of science and anthropology to examine energy models both conceptually and in the applied sense. We develop a conceptual approach on epistemological ethics that distinguishes between epistemic values – such as accuracy, simplicity, and adequate representation – and non-epistemic values – such as policy relevance, methodological limitations, and learning – built into energy models. The research question is: how do modellers articulate and negotiate epistemic values and what does this imply for the status of models in scientific practice and policymaking? The empirical part of the article draws from ethnographic fieldwork and interviews amongst 40 energy modellers in university research groups in the UK from two complementary arenas: scholars preparing their PhD in modelling and scholars working in a large-scale energy modelling project. Our research uses ethnographic methods to complement themes recognised in earlier literatures on modelling, demonstrating what models and modellers know about the energy system and how they come to know it in particular ways.
Highlights
Energy social science and transitions research have shown considerable interest in models and modelling in recent years
We studied the modelling practices by researchers from a large UK research consortium, the National Centre for Energy Systems Integration (CESI), alongside a wider group of academic energy modellers in the UK
We interviewed 12 modellers who were directly involved in the CESI project, to learn about how modellers in a modelling institution – in this case, a large-scale UK research project – position themselves with regards to issues recognised in philosophy of science
Summary
Energy social science and transitions research have shown considerable interest in models and modelling in recent years. Drawing from scholarly debate over recent decades, Diekmann and Peterson summarise certain kinds of qualities as epistemic values, including accuracy, simplicity, and adequate representation of the target system [3] These values are called epistemic because following them is primarily done in the pursuit of new knowledge. Models can have several other built-in values depending on their specific purpose, such as learning about the target system's sustainability, reliability, or safety; or considerations on the limits of research methods These can be described as non-epistemic values of models, because they are first and foremost aimed at objectives other than attaining new knowledge. The overall quality of these models does not, rely only on epistemic criteria, and on pragmatic solution-oriented considerations and on desired behaviours of the target system This raises important and often overlooked questions on how epistemic values are embedded alongside non-epistemic values in the modelling process.
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