Abstract
This paper explores the gains in vote shares accrued to an election candidate listed first on a ballot and examines how the gains vary with characteristics of elections and voters. Korea's election of education superintendent and its rule determining the name order of candidates provide a rare natural experiment to study ballot order effects. This paper proposes an empirical framework that addresses the aggregation problem that is prevalent in the related literature. According to the results, being listed first gives a positive premium for a majority of candidates and the gains are notable for less educated voters and in elections without an incumbent or strong candidate. This paper has also showed that different ballot order would have changed winners in some elections.
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