What can we learn meta-philosophically from how philosophers actually proceed in the philosophy of religion?

Abstract

Hanjo Glock is convinced that there is a real difference between philosophy and the empirical sciences. His ‘approach distinguishes the conceptual issues of philosophy from the factual issues of science’. According to Glock, there is a division of labour. Science has the task to establish all the relevant contingent facts about animals, while the task of philosophy is to provide clarification with regard to the pertinent mental concepts. I do not want to argue with Glock with regard to his favourite philosophical question—the question of animal minds. Instead, I shall shift the focus towards another area of philosophy—the philosophy of religion. My question is what we can learn in terms of meta-philosophy when we look more closely at which questions are dealt with by philosophers of religion and how they try to answer these questions. As a result, it will become clear that debates in the philosophy of religion are very different from the debate on the question of animal minds. Conceptual analyses do not play an important role. And Glock’s picture of a division of labour does not fit these debates. Since there is a great consensus that empirical sciences are of little help in answering the questions that philosophers of religion address, they have developed their own strategies. Aside from trying to show that the statement ‘God exists’ is an analytic truth and from seeking refuge in mystical perception, the preferred strategy for adherents as well as for opponents of theism is: Start from (allegedly) undeniable general facts and then try to show that these facts speak in favour of or against the existence of a transcendent world. Thus, large parts of the discussion circle around what can be concluded from what.