What can we experience and report on a rapidly presented image? Intersubjective measures of specificity of freely reported contents of consciousness.

Abstract

Background: A majority of previous studies appear to support a view that human observers can only perceive coarse information from a natural scene image when it is presented rapidly (<100ms, masked). In these studies, participants were often forced to choose an answer from options that experimenters preselected. These options can underestimate what participants experience and can report on it. The current study aims to introduce a novel methodology to investigate how detailed information participants can report after briefly seeing a natural scene image. Methods: We used a novel free-report paradigm to examine what people can freely report following a rapidly presented natural scene image (67/133/267ms, masked). N = 670 online participants typed up to five words to report what they saw in the image together with confidence of the respective responses. We developed a novel index, Intersubjective Agreement (IA). IA quantifies how specifically the response words were used to describe the target image, with a high value meaning the word is not often reported for other images. Importantly, IA eliminates the need for experimenters to preselect response options. Results: The words with high IA values are often something detailed (e.g., a small object) in a particular image. With IA, unlike commonly believed, we demonstrated that participants reported highly specific and detailed aspects of the briefly (even at 67ms, masked) shown image. Further, IA is positively correlated with confidence, indicating metacognitive conscious access to the reported aspects of the image. Conclusion: These new findings challenge the dominant view that the content of rapid scene experience is limited to global and coarse gist. Our novel paradigm opens a door to investigate various contents of consciousness with a free-report paradigm.