Abstract
Abstract In response to modern questions about traditional justifications for the need for labour law, the chapter explains that such a justification must be a theory of justice. The chapter argues that Sen’s capability approach cannot, contrary to Langille’s claims, provide such a theory of justice for three reasons: the approach endorses relatively unregulated markets, its goal-based approach cannot justify adequate institutional foundations for labour law, and it fails to recognize distributive justice as a key aim of labour law. Nevertheless, Sen’s capability approach can throw light on the justice of particular aspects of labour law such as affirmative action and the importance of flexibility, learning, and autonomy at work.
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