Abstract

Since market economies are the dominant form of regulating economic action all over the world, the question arises how markets are conceived theoretically. Answering this is relevant because we need to know how existing and hypothetical markets work in general, what they “can do”, and how one can improve the market order. There are three different market approaches that consider genuine uncertainty. According to the new institutional economics approach, markets are institutions that increase boundedly rational actors’ utility. The markets-as-institutional-arrangements approach denies that markets maximize or minimize market outcomes and argues that they enable harmony between individual and common interests. According to the political-cultural approach, markets are political arenas with conflicts between the relevant actors. Deciding reasonably for a theory requires answering whether one theory is more adequate than another. Since literature has not answered this so far, the present paper deals with this issue from a critical-rationalist perspective. It finds that the institutional economics approach is not adequate because its assumptions contradict reality and each other. In contrast, the markets-as-institutional-arrangements approach and the political-cultural approach fulfill critical-rationalist requirements. Therefore, the paper compares them and finds that there are reasons to prefer the political-cultural approach and to interpret the markets-as-institutional-arrangements approach as its special case. Referring to the political-cultural approach has different consequences for analyzing and improving the market order. Taking a political-cultural view implies, e.g., not only focusing on desirable social values and market rules but also on the relevance of interpretative frameworks and power.

Highlights

  • Market economies are the dominant form of regulating economic action and we can find great confidence in the abilities of markets (Chang 2011)

  • The present paper analyzes the new institutional economics approach (Furubotn and Richter 2005), the markets-as-institutional-arrangements approach (Vanberg 2001, 2005, 2011), and the political-cultural approach (Fligstein 1996, 2001) because it focuses on market theories that consider genuine uncertainty

  • While all previously named authors do not refer to the formalism of new institutional economics, we subsequently show that optimization is impossible even within the assumptions and the formal basis of new institutional economics

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Summary

Introduction

Market economies are the dominant form of regulating economic action and we can find great confidence in the abilities of markets (Chang 2011). The present paper analyzes the new institutional economics approach (Furubotn and Richter 2005), the markets-as-institutional-arrangements approach (Vanberg 2001, 2005, 2011), and the political-cultural approach (Fligstein 1996, 2001) because it focuses on market theories that consider genuine uncertainty. From an evolutionary perspective, there are approaches that deal with economic evolution on a micro, meso, and macro level (Potts 2000; Dopfer et al 2004; Dopfer and Potts 2008; Dopfer 2012; Witt 2008) Whilst their core focus is mechanisms of change, our subject is broader and deals with the question how markets work in general. Another group of theories we do not focus on is the derivative of new institutional economic theories that stresses the arbitration between hierarchies and markets or emphasizes the relevance of organizational hybrids between these poles (Ménard 2014).

Market theories from a critical rationalist perspective
Markets according to the markets‐as‐institutional‐arrangements approach
Conclusion and discussion
Full Text
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