“What a Fine Thing It Is to Be Able to Say to Oneself … ”: Reflexivity and Verbal Contexts in the Stoic Epictetus

Abstract

This article analyses how the Stoic philosopher Epictetus uses the reflexive pronoun (e.g. myself, yourself) in his teachings on human character formation. Following Jeremiah, who has highlighted the importance of Epictetus in the history of Western philosophical self-reflexivity, the article emphasises the different verbal contexts in which this pronoun is used to show how Epictetus employs the reflexive pronoun as a complement to verbs which would normally be constructed with referential others as complements (e.g. blaming, ridiculing, distrusting, fighting). Such usage expands and changes the range and nature of one’s relation to oneself. This article presents a philological-rhetorical analysis of such reflexive relations in Epictetus’ work through the lens of the philosophical issue of self and personhood. While one text from Epictetus has already been proposed as a candidate for the nominalisation of the reflexive pronoun (a/the self), this article introduces a second text into this discussion.