Abstract
The cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions reported by Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001; hereafter: WNS) laid the ground for the negative program of experimental philosophy. However, most of WNS’s findings were not corroborated in further studies. The exception here is the study concerning purported differences between Westerners and Indians in knowledge ascriptions concerning the Zebra Case, which was never properly replicated. Our study replicates the above-mentioned experiment on a considerably larger sample of Westerners (n = 211) and Indians (n = 204). The analysis found a significant difference between the ethnic groups in question in the predicted direction: Indians were more likely to attribute knowledge in the Zebra Case than Westerners. In this paper, we offer an explanation of our result that takes into account the fact that replications of WNS’s other experiments did not find any cross-cultural differences. We argue that the Zebra Case is unique among the vignettes tested by WNS since it should not be regarded as a Gettier case but rather as a scenario exhibiting skeptical pressure concerning the reliability of sense-perception. We argue that skepticism towards perception as a means of gaining knowledge is a trope that is deeply rooted in Western epistemology but is very much absent from Classical Indian philosophical inquiry. This line of reasoning is based on a thorough examination of the skeptical scenarios discussed by philosophers of the Indian Nyaya tradition and their adversaries.
Highlights
In their paper, which is believed to be one of the works that initiated experimental philosophy as a movement, Weinberg et al (2001; hereafter: WNS) argue that the usage of thought experiments in epistemology is unreliable
The analysis found a significant difference between the ethnic groups in question: the Indians were more likely to ascribe knowledge in the Zebra Case (55.9% of positive judgments) than the Westerners: z = 2.89; p = 0.002; Φ = 0.14
The main aim of this paper is to investigate cross-cultural differences between Indians and Westerners in their intuitions elicited by the Zebra Case
Summary
In their paper, which is believed to be one of the works that initiated experimental philosophy as a movement, Weinberg et al (2001; hereafter: WNS) argue that the usage of thought experiments in epistemology is unreliable They justify this claim by pointing out that we rely on our epistemic intuitions when evaluating thought experiments; as shown by their studies, these intuitions vary across various demographic variables (e.g. cultural background). There have been several attempts to corroborate WNS’s results (Nagel et al 2013; Seyedsayamdost 2015; Kim and Yuan 2015) None of these succeeded, which means that there are no confirmed cultural differences in epistemic intuitions in almost all the cases studied by WNS. An effort to confirm WNS’s results regarding the differences between Indians’ and Westerners’ intuitions elicited by the Zebra Case fits in recent projects which aim to corroborate findings from classic studies in experimental philosophy.
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