Western Europe and the October War

Abstract

The October war disrupted the humdrum pattern of international relations that had been woven around the Arab-Israeli conflict since June 1967. In the past, the European powers had played important roles, either directly as in the 1956 Suez attack, or indirectly by attempting to influence the turn of events, as in 1967. But already at the latter date, the decline of European power in the international arena was conspicuous. The October 1973 war contributed to the acceleration of this decline, as the preponderance of the two suiperpowers relegated Europe to a marginal role. The European powers found themselves in a defensive position, suffering the repercussions of the Middle East war, but for the first time being unable to bring an influence to bear upon it. This article attempts to outline Europe's reaction to the October war and to analyse both the contradictions and similarities between official government positions and their respective public opinions. Emphasis is placed upon the political trends which resulted, for the first time since the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), in a common political decision on the Middle East problem, and on the part played by the oil factor in this decision's making. On the other hand, the initial disarray, and the semblance of coordination that followed in the Nine's policies, brought to the surface incompatibilities not only in the relations between the European countries themselves, but also in the relations of the United States with Western Europe as a bloc. This raises the following question: at a moment when the EEC has adopted a neutral attitude to the conflict, will this stand endure in face of the internal pressuLres countering it, and will this frail cohesion on the political scale enhance the European ambition to become a mediator between the Arabs and Israel?