Western Europe—A Challenge and Opportunity

Abstract

M A AKING AN INTELLIGENT AND MEANINGFUL political and economic analysis of the present trends, current expectations and future implications in Western Europe appears, in this fast-moving age, a near impossible task. A compilation and evaluation of the more pertinent factors which are underlying the basic relationships between the East and the West, and within the West itself, may hopefully accomplish the objective. Within the confines of this analysis may be the meaningful facts which should bring Europe and the United States even closer together through cooperative ventures, acquisition of American stocks in Europe and even more European shares in the U. S. In the light of annual visits Western Europe over the last 10 years, it must be agreed that the prestige of the United States in that part of the world has not been lower than it is right now. Lack of confidence in Washington's judgment, disagreements between Washington on the one and Bonn and Paris on the other hand, accompanied by the hopeful expectation that an intelligent President Kennedy will ultimately prevail, seems the best description of Europe's current state-of-mind. The problem is focused on the reaction or lack of reaction by the United States Government the constant, and what Europe calls, the monotonous pounding by Premier Khrushchev on the Berlin question. With the exception of the British, there is general agreement among government officials and public opinion leaders that the United States has been reacting too slowly and too sluggishly this challenge from Moscow. There must be recognition, however, that possibly as a result of persistent Soviet propaganda efforts far too many Europeans in responsible positions express distinct fear of the undue influence of the Pentagon on American policy evolution in this respect. It was most disturbing hear the reaction from intelligent individuals that the United States may possibly initiate a preventive war to solve the East-West problems. The theory-startling when first heardgoes more along these lines: In the evaluation of military postures the Pentagon is now convinced that the West has still a slight advantage over the Soviet Union which may be dissipated in the foreseeable future. If the Russians are politically difficult now, how then will they react upon reaching the now expected military maturity and superiority over the West? It was frightening realize that so many well-meaning and actually-friendly-toward-the-United-States individuals hold this point of view. The initial showing of strength by the United States in West Berlin and then followed by passiveness over, what these same Europeans call, minor points is cited as an indication of this Pentagonitis. Hope is expressed rather widely by the Europeans that President Kennedy can withstand this pressure and will attempt try chart a course which, while following along the brink, would provide enough leeway for eventual understanding between East and West.