Abstract
The design of lattice coset codes for wiretap channels is considered. Bounds on the eavesdropper's correct decoding probability and information leakage are first revisited. From these bounds, it is explicit that both the information leakage and error probability are controlled by the average flatness factor of the eavesdropper's lattice, which we further interpret geometrically. It is concluded that the minimization of the (average) flatness factor of the eavesdropper's lattice leads to the study of well-rounded lattices, which are shown to be among the optimal in order to achieve these minima. Constructions of some well-rounded lattices are also provided.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
