Abstract
Kitcher has proposed an ideal-theory account—well-ordered science (WOS)—of the collective good that science’s research agenda should promote. Against criticism regarding WOS’s action guidance, Kitcher has advised critics not to confuse substantive ideals and the ways to arrive at them, and he has defended WOS as a necessary and useful ideal for science policy. I provide a distinction between two types of ideal theories that helps clarifying WOS’s elusive nature. I use this distinction to argue that the action-guidance problem that WOS faces remains even under the aims/means distinction because the WOS’s failure is more basic than critics have suggested.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
